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The Origins of Constitutional Dialogue 
 
Chapter One 
 
The United States Constitution has been preserved and protected for over two hundred 
years. Since its creation, the text has endured a civil war, economic depression, political 
corruption, and foreign attack. The ability of the text to remain applicable over the course of 
American history, through both ordinary and extraordinary circumstances, makes the 
Constitution a remarkable document within a remarkable area of study.  
As the most powerful legal text of the American government, the Constitution acts as the 
fundamental rulebook for all government actors. The “supreme Law of the Land” provides that 
all “Senators and Representatives,” “Members of the several State Legislatures,” and “executive 
and judicial Officers” are bound to the text upon taking their oath.1 To fulfill their promise, all 
three Federal departments are expected to abide by the Constitution when carrying out their 
responsibilities. When unfamiliar situations arise, however, the guidelines put forth in the 
Constitution frequently become unclear and give rise to conflicting interpretations. Although the 
document provides space for dialogue and debate over constitutional meaning, it does not, in its 
text, allow for multiple arbitrations. In the event of a constitutional dispute, therefore, it has 
become common in the American system to determine a final arbiter.  
Today, it is widely accepted that the Supreme Court acts as the authoritative interpreter of 
the Constitution. When questions of constitutionality divide the American people, the modern 
narrative of resolution dictates that the disputing parties bring the issue before the Court to 
determine a constitutionally appropriate settlement. The narrative further maintains that once the 
Court renders a decision, the ruling becomes law and is enforced by all other departments of 
                                                        
1
 U.S. Constitution. Art. 6, Sect. 2,3. 
 4 
government. In light of today’s major Supreme Court decisions, it is clear that judicial opinion 
dominates contemporary constitutional settlements.  
In recent past, the Supreme Court has controlled the outcome of the nation’s most 
controversial debates. The Court has been responsible for determining a presidential victor, 
striking down campaign finance reform, authorizing universal health care, and legalizing same-
sex marriage at the federal level. Despite opposition to these contentious rulings, all government 
officials have continued to enforce the judgments made by the Court. This contemporary 
dynamic of American government is defined as the theory of judicial supremacy and acts as first 
of the three modes of constitutional interpretation discussed in my work. As the name indicates, 
this theory of interpretation asserts that the Supreme Court is the dominant voice of 
constitutional meaning over all other interpretations. Frederick Schauer expands on this premise 
in his study “Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution,” “Supreme Court interpretations 
of the Constitution are understood by other branches of government and by the people as 
authoritative, not necessarily because of their wisdom but solely because of their source.”2 Not 
only do the American people respect the opinion of the judiciary because of its position 
institutionally, but also because of the esteemed nature of the branch itself. The Court is largely 
understood to be ‘above the fray’ in terms of political disputes, focused only on preserving the 
Constitution in light of the Founders’ original convictions. Thus, as the legitimacy of the Court 
has developed, judicial supremacy has come to entail that all actors, political and nonpolitical, 
accept Supreme Court decisions as law regardless of their own interpretations.  
Despite the modern dominance of the Supreme Court in constitutional debates, recent 
scholarship has emerged to challenge the notion of judicial supremacy as the controlling 
                                                        
2
 Frederick Schauer, “Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution.” California Law Review 92 (2004): 1047. 
 5 
narrative.
3
 In their work, academics such as Larry Kramer, Michael Stokes Paulsen and Mark 
Tushnet bring alternative methods of constitutional interpretation into focus through historical 
analyses of challenges to judicial supremacy.
4
 In light of such existing scholarship, two 
alternative methods of constitutional interpretation have become prevalent in the discussion of 
challenges to judicial supremacy. The first theory, popular constitutionalism, is based on the 
notion that the American people assume “active and ongoing control over the interpretation and 
enforcement of constitutional law” as the sovereign creators of the founding text.5 The second 
theory, departmentalism, offers the argument that all three branches of federal government have 
equal authority to interpret the Constitution.
6
 Unlike judicial supremacy, which defines justices 
as the sole interpreters of the text, departmentalism argues that legislators and presidents, upon 
taking their oaths, must also interpret the meaning of the Constitution in an equally authoritative 
manner. Both of these theories challenge the widespread understanding that there must be one 
interpretation of the text. 
In light of these previous works and the emerging dialogue on alternative modes of 
interpretation, my study will research the role of popular constitutionalism and departmentalism 
in times of heightened judicial supremacy. To analyze the potential for these alternative theories 
to exist in modern constitutional dialogue, I will introduce two case studies that examine 
constitutional discrepancy in the wake of enhanced judicial dominance. By highlighting two 
                                                        
3
 Frank Easterbrook, “Presidential Review.” Case Western Reserve University Law Review 40 (1990); Louis Fisher, 
Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretations as Political Process (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Larry 
D. Kramer, “Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004.” California Law Review 92 (2004); Thomas W. Merrill, 
“Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments.” Cardozo Law Review 15 (1993); Bruce 
Peabody, “Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and A New Agenda for Research.” 
Constitutional Commentary 16 (1999); Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegal, “Popular Constitutionalism, 
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy.” Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series 178 (2004). 
4
 Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Michael Stokes Paulsen, “Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive 
Branch Interpretation.” Cardozo Law Review 81 (1993); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the 
Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
5
 Kramer, “Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004,” 959. 
6
 Post and Siegal, “Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy,” 1031. 
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pivotal moments in American history in which the Supreme Court exerted aggressively visible 
judicial supremacy over public policy, I will assess the capabilities and limitations of alternative 
interpretations in challenging the opinion of the Court. By examining the methods used by 
political actors in their confrontation to the supremacy of the Court, my study will attempt to 
answer the following questions: Is it possible for alternative modes of constitutional 
interpretation to exist in a system of enhanced judicial supremacy? Or, does the dominating 
nature of judicial supremacy prevent additional interpretations from becoming relevant to 
constitutional dialogue? 
To more comprehensively introduce these three theories of interpretation utilized in my 
study, the remainder of the first chapter will elaborate on the origins and development of each 
method to place them appropriately in American constitutional history. Following this 
discussion, my second chapter will focus on the challenges posed by President Abraham Lincoln 
to the Supreme Court following the decisions Dred Scott v. Sanford and Ex parte Merryman. In 
light of these confrontations, my third chapter will investigate the challenges brought by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt in response to the Court’s determination of economic policy 
following Lochner v. New York. To conclude my study, the final chapter of my work will reflect 
on the questions I have posed and attempt to reconcile my findings in contemporary 
constitutional dialogue. 
 
The Impracticalities of Popular Constitutionalism  
 
Although judicial supremacy functions as the dominant mode of constitutional 
interpretation today, the debates of the founding era were focused primarily on popular 
 7 
constitutionalism. Unlike ordinary law that is created by the government to “regulate and restrain 
the people,” the Constitution was established as the nation’s fundamental law, created through 
popular sovereignty or “by the people to regulate and restrain the government.”7 Thus, as 
“regulators” of the government, the American people were determined, at least in theory, to have 
the final say on constitutional questions. 
To empower the people, the Founders integrated two main doctrines into the Constitution 
including the doctrine of fundamental law and the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
8
 By creating 
the Constitution as fundamental law, the Framers provided that all legislation enacted from that 
point on must conform to the standard set out in the founding document. This notion of “higher 
law” was derived from the American colonial experience. Prior to winning independence, the 
American colonies were bound by English Charters and thus, expected to create laws consistent 
with the legal standard established by the British. During this period, if legislation were passed 
that encroached on the defined limitations within the charter, the British Privy Council would 
review and invalidate the law.
9
 Thus, along the same lines, the Constitution was intended to 
serve as the dominant legal authority. To ensure its dominance, the Founders included the 
Supremacy Clause,   
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
                                                        
7
 Larry D. Kramer, “Judicial Supremacy and the End of Judicial Restraint.” California Law Review 100 (2012) 622. 
8
 Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court: Fifth Edition, ed. Sanford Levinson (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2010), 7. 
9
 James B. Thayer, “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law.” Harvard Law Review 7 
(1893): 131. 
 8 
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.
10
  
By including the clause within the Constitution, the Founders necessitated that all government 
legislation and action comply with the text and principles ingrained in the text.  
After empowering the Constitution through the doctrine of fundamental law, the 
Founders limited the potential for government abuse of that power through the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty. By including “We the People” as the authorizing body in the preamble of 
the Constitution and providing the method of convention in the amendment process, the 
Founders established the American people as the source of constitutional authority. As 
McCloskey recounts, “The American pamphleteers had insisted on the principle of home rule; 
the Declaration of Independence had founded just government on the “consent of the governed”; 
the next and natural step was to regard the people as not only a consenting but a willing entity 
and to declare as Jefferson later said, that “the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail.””11In 
the event that the government interpreted the Constitution in conflict with the will of the people, 
the doctrine of popular sovereignty necessitated that the government alter its behavior. Thus, 
popular sovereignty mandated that the power to authoritatively interpret the fundamental law 
belonged to the people, ingraining popular constitutionalism directly into the Constitution.  
Although the Founders agreed, in theory, to the supremacy of the people over 
constitutional meaning, the mode in which the public was to articulate their will was more 
controversial. Some of the Founders believed that the people must be directly involved in 
constitutional alterations. Thomas Jefferson, a principal advocate for popular constitutionalism, 
proposed a plan that would allow the American people to correct “breaches” of the Constitution 
                                                        
10
 U.S. Constitution. Art. 6, Sect. 2. 
11
 McCloskey, The American Supreme Court, 7. 
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directly. In his draft for the state constitution of Virginia, he offered the proposal, “Any two of 
the three branches of government concurring in opinion, each by the voices of two thirds of their 
whole existing number, that a convention is necessary for altering this constitution, or correcting 
breaches of it, they shall be authorized to issue writs to every county for the election of so many 
delegates as they are authorized to send to the General Assembly…”12 Jefferson believed that the 
people could be involved in solving constitutional issues directly by electing delegates to attend 
conventions on the conflicts. In creating a forum for the public to participate in constitutional 
debates, Jefferson sought to “formalize the people’s role in supervising constitutional law.”13 
This method, however, proved to be problematic for other members of the Founding era.  
James Madison, the so-called “Father of the Constitution” supported popular 
constitutionalism, in theory, but expressed concerns over the challenges of its practice. In 
Federalist No. 49, James Madison explained his appreciation for Jefferson’s proposal, 
The plan, like every thing from the same pen, marks a turn of thinking, original, 
comprehensive, and accurate; and is the more worthy of attention as it equally displays a 
fervent attachment to republican government and an enlightened view of the dangerous 
propensities against which it ought to be guarded…. 
As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the 
constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold their power, 
is derived; it seems strictly consonant to the republican theory, to recur to the same 
original authority, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new 
model the powers of government; but also whenever any one of the departments may 
commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others. The several departments 
                                                        
12
 Thomas Jefferson, “Draught of a Fundamental Constitution for the Commonwealth of Virginia,” in Notes on the 
States of Virginia, ed. William Peden (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954), 221.  
13
 Kramer, The People Themselves, 45. 
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being co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is 
evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between 
their respective powers: and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented, 
or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an appeal to the people themselves, 
who, as the grantors of the commission, can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce 
its observance?
14
 
Madison understood the reasoning behind Jefferson’s proposal, so much so that he believed it to 
be “enlightened.” Because the people authorized the government, it would only make sense to 
appeal to popular will when settling constitutional questions. The feasibility of the plan, 
however, seemed problematic for Madison.  
In the remainder of Federalist No. 49, Madison outlines the dangerous consequences that 
he foresees resulting from appeals to the majority. His first concern is over the damage that 
frequent appeals would have to the legitimacy of the government. Madison writes, “…it may be 
considered as an objection inherent in the principle, that, as every appeal to the people would 
carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in a great 
measure, deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on every thing, and 
without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite 
stability.”15 For Madison, if the government were to be consistently reviewed by the people, it 
would lose the legitimacy it needed to keep order. Madison’s second concern involved the 
difficulty of reconciling multiple interpretations, on which he reasons, 
The danger of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public 
passions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional 
                                                        
14
 James Madison, “Federalist No. 49,” in The Federalist: The Gideon Edition, ed. George W. Carey and James 
McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 260-261. 
15
 Madison, “Federalist No. 49,” 262. 
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questions to the decision of the whole society. Notwithstanding the success which has 
attended the revisions of our established forms of government, and which does so much 
honor to the virtue and intelligence of the people of America, it must be confessed that 
the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied.
16
 
Although the participants of the Constitutional Convention had been successful in making 
concessions to ratify the Constitution, Madison expresses his doubts as to the ability of the 
American people to reach the same types of agreements.  
Madison’s final concern over Jefferson’s plan involves the tendency for people to make 
decisions based on their political affiliations. In his explanation, he argues that it is human nature 
for people to side with members of their own political party. Thus, when determining 
constitutional questions, Madison concludes, “The passions, therefore, not the reason, of the 
public would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, of the public alone, that ought to control and 
regulate the government. The passions ought to be controled and regulated by the government.”17 
According to Madison, the American people were influenced too easily by their political ties to 
make a sensible decision. Therefore, although he saw the importance of maintaining popular 
will, Madison found popular constitutionalism, by way of conventions, to be problematic 
 
Popular Constitutionalism vs. Judicial Supremacy-“A dialectical tug of war” 
 
As James Madison had asserted in his response to Thomas Jefferson’s proposal, the 
functionality of popular constitutionalism was troublesome. Appealing directly to the people in 
times of constitutional dispute, Madison argued, would result in reduced reverence for the 
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 Madison, “Federalist No. 49,” 262. 
17
 Madison, Federalist No. 49,” 264. 
 12 
government, further interpretational disputes, and increased popular passions. In light of these 
anticipated difficulties, the Founders searched for an alternative source of interpretational 
authority.  
For some of the Founders, the judicial branch appeared to be the most fitting replacement 
for popular involvement. Vesting the Supreme Court with the “judicial power of the United 
States,” Article III gives the Court the authority to adjudicate on “all cases, in law and equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their authority.”18 Given that the Court was granted the power to uphold the 
Constitution in all cases under its jurisdiction, some of the Founders believed that the judicial 
branch was constitutionally specified to make the final interpretation of the text. This line of 
reasoning serves as the foundation for the theory of judicial supremacy. 
The idea of judicial dominance was built over time, through the establishment of two 
major doctrines during the Founding era: the doctrine of judicial independence and the doctrine 
of judicial review. Robert G. McCloskey describes this development in his narrative on the 
evolution of the Supreme Court. In his work, McCloskey argues that the Court had to settle 
“three major role problems” before it could secure its place as the final interpreter of the 
Constitution including judicial independence, judicial review, and judicial supremacy.
19
 Thus, 
over time, the concept of judicial supremacy would develop organically from the successful 
development of these two doctrines.  
Since the drafting of the Constitution, the tensions between popular constitutionalism and 
judicial supremacy have been escalating. Popular constitutionalism champions the American 
people as the final arbiters of the Constitution, while judicial supremacy is contingent upon the 
                                                        
18
 U.S. Constitution. Art. 3, Sect. 1,2. 
19
 McCloskey, The American Supreme Court, 18.  
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finality of judicial decisions. It is therefore not surprising that Kramer argues in his work, 
“Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004,” that the two theories have remained in a consistent 
battle for dominancy since the start of the American government.
20
 The inception of this struggle 
is evident in early discourse over the role of the Court.  
The most prominent advocate for judicial authority over constitutional interpretation was 
Alexander Hamilton who built a formidable defense for both judicial independence and judicial 
review in Federalist No. 78. In his essay, Hamilton argues that it is the constitutionally 
determined duty of the Court to uphold the Constitution against all encroachments.  
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A 
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It 
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any 
particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an 
irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and 
validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be 
preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
21
 
As the “bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments,” Hamilton argues 
that the Supreme Court is granted the authority to determine if legislation is contradictory to the 
Constitution.
22
 This judicial practice of reviewing and invalidating legislation passed by other 
departments of government is known as judicial review. Hamilton defends this procedure as an 
inevitable implication of the Court’s role to protect “the intention of the people”; because the 
                                                        
20
 Kramer, “Popular Constitutionalism,” 959. 
21
 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 78,” in The Federalist: The Gideon Edition, ed. George W. Carey and James 
McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 404. 
22
 Hamilton, “Federalist No. 78,” 405. 
 14 
Court is obligated to uphold the Constitution, it cannot give legitimacy to any law in violation of 
it.  
In addition to protecting the Constitution from contradictory laws, Hamilton argues that 
the Supreme Court is also in a unique position to protect individual liberties. Free from elections 
and granted life tenure during “good behavior,” 23 justices are, in theory, free from political 
accountability. Hamilton argues that this judicial independence of the Court allows justices to 
practice “inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the constitution, and of individuals.”24 
In Federalist No. 78, he contends that the Judiciary protects individuals from “the effects of 
those ill humours which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, 
sometimes disseminate among the people themselves…to occasion dangerous innovations in the 
government, and serious oppression of the minor party in the community.”25 Because the 
Supreme Court is not empowered by popular will, Hamilton argues, it is the only government 
body capable of protecting the oppressions of minorities.  
Alexander Hamilton was not alone in his support of judicial review and judicial 
independence. James Iredell, one of the first justices of the Supreme Court, reiterated many of 
Hamilton’s defenses. In a letter to Governor Richard Spaight, Iredell argues that judicial review 
is an unavoidable task of the Judiciary, necessary to protect individual liberties,  
In a republican government (as I conceive) individual liberty is a matter of the utmost 
moment, as, if there be no check upon the public passions, it is in the greatest danger. The 
majority having the rule in their own hands, may take care of themselves; but in what 
condition are the minority, if the power of the other is without limit?...The Constitution, 
therefore, being a fundamental law, and a law in writing of solemn nature I have 
                                                        
23
 U.S. Constitution. Art. 3, Sect.1. 
24
 Hamilton, “Federalist No. 78,” 407. 
25
 Hamilton, “Federalist No. 78,” 405. 
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mentioned (which is the light in which it strikes me), the judicial power, in the exercise of 
their authority, must take notice of it as the groundwork of that as well as of all other 
authority; and as no article of the Constitution can be repealed by a Legislature, which 
derives its whole power from it, it follows either that the fundamental unrepealable law 
must be obeyed, by the rejection of an act unwarranted by and inconsistent with it, or you 
must obey an act founded on an authority not given by the people, and to which, 
therefore, the people owe no obedience. It is not that judges are appointed arbiters, and to 
determine as it were upon any application, whether the Assembly have or have not 
violated the Constitution; but when an act is necessarily brought in judgment before 
them, they must, unavoidably determine one way or another.”26 
In his letter, Iredell makes it clear that Supreme Court justices are not “appointed arbiters,” 
demonstrating the nonexistence of the judicial supremacy theory at this time. Due to their 
assigned duties mandated by the founding text, however, justices must make judgments on 
legislation. Without the ability to invalidate unconstitutional acts, Iredell reasons, the Supreme 
Court would be unable to preserve fundamental law or protect individual liberties. 
Despite Hamilton and Iredell’s assertions of the Judiciary as a protective body, many 
people were concerned by the heightened power that judicial independence and judicial review 
granted the Court. Robert Yates (under the pseudonym “Brutus”), author of the Anti-Federalists 
papers, found the political freedom of justices to be deeply problematic. In his paper Brutus No. 
11, Yates argues that giving justices independence from political accountability allowed them to 
“determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and spirit of the constitution.” 
Without “power provided in the constitution, that can correct their errors or control their 
                                                        
26
 James Iredell, “Letter to Richard Spaight, August 26th, 1787,” in Life and Correspondence of James Iredell: One 
of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, ed. Griffith John McRee (New York: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1857), 173. 
 16 
adjudications,” judges would “mold the government, into almost any shape they please.”27 
Without accountability for their decisions, Yates argued, the justices would shape public policy 
to their own interests. 
In response to concerns over the increasing power of the Court, Hamilton argues that the 
Judiciary is the “least dangerous branch” to the political rights of the Constitution. In his essay 
Federalist No. 78, Hamilton writes,   
The judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the 
political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure 
them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the 
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by 
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the 
contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the 
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It 
may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must 
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its 
judgments.
28
 
Without control over the federal budget like the legislative branch or control over the armed 
forces like the executive branch, Hamilton concludes that the Judiciary is the least able “to annoy 
or injure” political rights. Unable to fund or enforce its decisions, Hamilton argues, the Supreme 
Court only has the power to determine a verdict. As a seemingly weak and politically 
autonomous body, the Supreme Court was determined by Hamilton to be the most fit to uphold 
the Constitution.  
                                                        
27
 Robert Yates, “Brutus No. 11,” in The Complete Anti-Federalist, ed. Herbert J. Strong (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1981), 420-422. 
28
 Hamilton, “Federalist No. 78,” 405. 
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 The doctrine of judicial review incited similar disagreements during the founding era, 
becoming “one of the greatest and most controversial contributions of the Constitution to the law 
and politics of government.”29 To define the doctrine more clearly, Keith Whittington describes 
the procedure as “the authority of a court, in the context of deciding a particular case, to refuse to 
give force to any act of another governmental institution on the grounds that such an act is 
contrary to the requirement of the Constitution.”30 Judicial review allowed the Court to evaluate 
the behavior of its so-called “coordinate” branches of government. 
In addition to its controversial nature, judicial review also incited contention because of 
the lack of explicit authorization in the Constitution. Article III, as “the sole constitutional source 
of the federal judiciary’s power to act,”31 never mentions anything about the judicial power to 
invalidate federal legislation. The first section of Article III, known as the Vesting clause, 
provides that “the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”32 The 
following provisions of Article III identify the limitations on the Courts’ powers by limiting the 
areas of dispute in which the Judiciary can act. Not once does the text authorize the Judiciary to 
review or invalidate an act of another federal branch of government.   
Despite the disagreement over the validity of judicial review, however, the practice 
became legal precedent in Marbury v. Madison. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice John 
Marshall used textual support to conclude that the Court must invalidate congressional action. In 
his ruling, Marshall refuses to enforce legislation on the assertion that it violated the text of the 
                                                        
29
 David M. O’Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics: Eighth Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 23. 
30
 Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and 
Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 8. 
31
 Gary Lawson and Christopher Moore, “The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation,” Iowa Law Review 
81 (1996): 1996. 
32
 U.S. Constitution. Art.3, Sect. 1. 
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Constitution. As put by Samuel Konefsky, “His exposition of fundamental political precepts 
makes it plain that for Marshall, as for Hamilton, judicial review of legislation flowed logically-
indeed inevitably-from the very nature of the institutions created by the Constitution.”33 Marshall 
reasoned, as did Hamilton in Federalist No. 78, that the supremacy of the Constitution 
necessitates judicial review, 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. 
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret the 
rule. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution 
apply to a particular case, so that the court must decide that case conformably to the law, 
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; 
the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is the 
very essence of judicial duty [emphasis added]… It is also not entirely unworthy of 
observation that, in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution 
itself is mentioned first, and not the laws of the United States generally, but only those 
which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank.
34
 
Marshall reasons that because the Constitution is fundamental law and the Judiciary has been 
bound to uphold the Constitution, the Supreme Court must refuse to support any law that acts 
contrary to it. Thus, Marshall legalizes what Hamilton had worked so hard to defend: the 
authority of the Court to review and invalidate acts made by other branches of government. 
 With the establishment of both the doctrine of judicial independence and the doctrine of 
judicial review, the theory of judicial supremacy became an active mode of constitutional 
interpretation. Just as Kramer had claimed in his work, the expansion of judicial authority 
                                                        
33
 Samuel Joseph Konefsky, John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton: Architects of the American Constitution (New 
York: Macmillan, 1964), 83. 
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resulted in the weakening of popular constitutionalism, marking the beginning of the “dialectical 
tug of war” between the two.  
 
An Evolution of Popular Constitutionalism- Departmentalism 
 
In light of the difficulties of practical popular constitutionalism, the theory of 
departmentalism emerged during the infancy of the American government as another mode to 
challenge judicial supremacy. The theory of departmentalism or “coordinate construction,” 
functions on the premise that “the President and members of Congress have both the authority 
and competence to engage in constitutional interpretation, not only before the courts decide but 
after as well. All three branches perform a valuable, broad, and ongoing function in helping to 
shape the meaning of the Constitution.”35 During the first constitutional conflicts between the 
judicial and executive branches, Presidents Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson utilized the 
departmentalist argument to challenge the expanding authority of the Court.  
As the first presidential opponent of the Court, Thomas Jefferson was strongly opposed to 
the notion that the decisions made by the Supreme Court and other federal courts were binding 
on the other departments.
36
 In defense of his defiance to the Judiciary in pardoning those 
convicted under the Sedition Act of 1798, Jefferson employs the theory of departmentalism. In a 
letter to Abigail Adams, Jefferson proclaims, 
[N]othing in the Constitution has given [the judiciary] a right to decide for the Executive, 
more than to the executive to decide for them. Both magistracies are equally independent 
in the sphere of action assigned to them. The judges, believing the [law] constitutional, 
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had a right to pass a sentence of fine and imprisonment, because that power was placed in 
their hands by the Constitution. But the executive, believing the law unconstitutional, was 
bound to remit the execution of it; because that power had been confided to him by the 
Constitution. That instrument meant that its coordinate branches should be checks on 
each other. But the opinion which give to the judges the right to decide what laws are 
constitutional, and what are not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but 
for the Legislature & Executive also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary a 
despotic branch.
37
 
By interpreting the constitutionality of the Sedition Act as independent body, Jefferson asserts 
that all three federal branches have a duty to determine the constitutionality of the law in their 
sphere of authority. In the event that the Judiciary had the ability to interpret the Constitution for 
both Congress and the President, Jefferson reasons, the judicial branch would be tyrannical. 
Thus, Jefferson concludes, “each of the three departments has equally the right to decide for 
itself what is its duty under the Constitution, without any regard to what the others may have 
decided for themselves under a similar question.”38 Through Jefferson’s conflict with the Court, 
the theory of departmentalism is born. 
In a second attack against judicial supremacy, President Andrew Jackson rebukes the 
constitutionality of the second National Bank and strengthens Jefferson’s departmentalist claims. 
In his explanation for vetoing the bill to reinstate the bank, Jackson argues: 
The Congress, The Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own 
opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the 
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Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood 
by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of 
the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be 
presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be 
brought before them for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more 
authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that 
point the President is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not, 
therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their 
legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may 
deserve.
39
 
As a public officer, Jackson argues, it is his duty to decide the constitutionality of laws presented 
to him for enactment. In the footsteps of Jefferson, Jackson concludes that the interpretations of 
all branches of federal government have equal authority and that the Court cannot bind the other 
branches to their judgment. 
As implied by both Jefferson and Jackson in their defenses, the theory of 
departmentalism formed as an evolution of popular constitutionalism. In each of their 
explanations, both presidents argue that they are bound to fulfill the oath they took to “preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."
40
 In defending their interpretation of 
the Constitution, each president reasons that they are performing their duty to protect the 
American people. Without the ability to directly participate in constitutional dialogue, the public 
empowers the legislative and executive branches to convey their interpretation of the 
Constitution. Kramer provides another account of this implication, 
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Each branch could express its views as issues came before it in the ordinary course of 
business: the legislature by enacting laws, the executive by vetoing them, the judiciary by 
reviewing them. But none of the branches’ views were final or authoritative. They were 
the actions of regulated entities striving to follow the law that governed them, subject to 
ongoing supervision by their common superior, the people themselves.
41
   
According to Kramer’s departmentalist theory, elected officials act as agents of the people in 
interpreting the Constitution, subject to popular will through political mechanisms such as 
elections.  
For others, such as Lawson and Moore, departmentalism is an implication of the structure 
of government. According to the scholars, the separation of powers creates room for multiple 
interpretations of the Constitution, 
Dividing power across jurisdictions and among institutions is a recipe for uncertainty and 
conflict. One cannot be sure that a bill that passes one house will pass another, that a bill 
that passes Congress will be signed by the President, that legislation once enacted will be 
enforced in a particular or predictable way, or that enacted and enforced legislation will 
be interpreted and applied by the courts in a particular or predictable way. Moreover, the 
division of powers is consciously designed to place the government in an ongoing state of 
tension, with each institution in a constant struggle with the others for power and 
prestige; such is the clear message of Madison's brilliant essay on governmental structure 
in The Federalist. All of this chaos and conflict was deliberately left to us by the founders 
because they deemed it necessary to preserve liberty. Departmentalism is simply one 
aspect of the separation of powers.
42
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By pinning government institutions against one another, Lawson and Moore argue, the Founders 
created a system that encourages government actors to question each other’s authority. In a 
government in which all government officials take an oath to uphold the Constitution, it is 
necessary that all of those actors would interpret the text in their own way, independent of other 
branches. 
Whether departmentalism has emerged as an implication of popular constitutionalism or 
of the separation of powers, it is clear that all three federal branches must, to some extent, 
interpret the Constitution. According to Walter Murphy’s “Who Shall Interpret,” each federal 
branch must individually interpret the Constitution to effectively perform its respective duties.
43
 
In his work, Murphy argues that the Legislative branch is granted interpretive power through the 
“Necessary and Proper” Clause, defining what is “necessary” and “proper” in accordance with 
existing constitutional principles.
44
 Similarly, Murphy contends that the President must also 
interpret the founding document when carrying out his duty to “preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution.”45 Thus, just as Article III binds the Supreme Court to the Constitution, Congress 
and the President must also uphold the text when carrying out their constitutional obligations. 
In looking more specifically at the role of the president in interpreting the meaning of the 
Constitution, scholars have debated what behavior is appropriate and within the confines of the 
Constitution. According to Thomas Merrill, the Take Care Clause of the Constitution grants the 
President the authority to determine that “the judicial understanding of law is wrong.” 46 In light 
of Article II, Section 3 which provides that “He shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,” it is the duty of the president to execute laws that conform to the Constitution. Thus, 
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Merrill concludes, in the event that the president disagrees with the constitutionality of a judicial 
opinion, he can refuse to follow it.
47
  
Other scholars such Louis Fisher and Keith Whittington argue that the authority of the 
judiciary relies upon the presidential acceptance of their decisions. In his work “Constitutional 
Dialogues: Interpretations as Political Process,” Louis Fisher argues that the Court is neither 
“final nor infallible.” Instead, Congress, the President, and the American people must accept the 
opinions of justices if they are to remain authoritative interpretations of the text. Without such 
approval, “the debate on constitutional principles will continue.”48 Keith Whittington offers a 
similar argument, contesting that the Court competes with other political actors for authority to 
define the terms of the Constitution. In focusing on the role of the President, Whittington argues 
that the executive must “see some political value in deferring to the Court and helping to 
construct a space for judicial autonomy.”49 
Recent scholarship has developed to outline the interpretational benefits of 
departmentalism. According to Bruce Peabody in his work “Nonjudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and A New Agenda for Research,” various 
interpretations across branches produces “greater diffusion of interpretive responsibility (which) 
might allow for what is ultimately a deeper consensus about constitutional meaning as a variety 
of political actors engage in and legitimate the interpretive process.”50 In light of the valuable 
dialogue initiated by multiple interpretations, Peabody argues, alternative methods of 
constitutionalism may lead to the preservation of constitutional values. In turn, he concludes, “It 
is not clear that the conceded goods of settlement, stability and coordination should be given 
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priority over all other legal and constitutional values, or that they can only be protected by 
authoritatively binding interpretations to the Supreme Court.”51 
Although departmentalism has received considerable support from scholars, there are 
also academics that express concerns over the weakening of judicial supremacy. In his essay 
“Judicial Opinion as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments,” Thomas Merrill argues 
that the president is responsible for enforcing judicial decision. Merrill claims, “…there is 
widespread agreement that the executive has a legal duty to enforce valid final judgments 
rendered by courts, regardless of whether the executive agrees with the legal analysis that forms 
the basis for the judgment.”52 Michael Stokes Paulsen expands on the problems of 
departmentalism, arguing “the premises of executive interpretive autonomy and of judicial 
supremacy are, in principle, irreconcilable. Either the executive branch possesses the prerogative 
of autonomous legal interpretation within the sphere of its powers or it is subordinate to the 
judiciary; the two propositions cannot peacefully coexist.”53 Similar to the Kramer’s imagery of 
the “dialectical tug of war” between popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy, Paulsen 
contends that departmentalism is also incompatible with judicial supremacy.  
 The following two case studies that constitute the second and third chapter will explore 
these claims of incompatibility, looking closely at the conflicts between the Supreme Court and 
their presidential opponents. 
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Abraham Lincoln v The Taney Court 
 
Chapter Two 
 
 The first case study of my work focuses on Abraham Lincoln’s confrontation with the 
Supreme Court during the early years of the American Civil War, including the tensions leading 
up to the war resulting from Dred Scott v. Sanford and the dispute taking place during the war 
with the opinion of Ex parte Merryman. Prior to Lincoln’s presidency, the Court had exercised 
heightened judicial authority in ruling on the constitutionality of slavery. Encompassing the 
theory of judicial supremacy, the Court had attempted to dictate national policy and settle the 
most complicated of social debates. Thus, when Lincoln enters into his presidency he is 
confronted by a system of judicial dominance to which he combats with by championing notions 
of popular constitutionalism and departmentalism. 
 
Historical Foundations of Constitutional Controversy 
 
The decade leading up to the Civil War set an appropriate stage for the constitutional 
conflict between Abraham Lincoln and the Supreme Court. During this period, the entire country 
was divided, primarily along sectional lines, due to their differing perceptions of the 
Constitution.
54
 Thus, as put by Daniel Farber in his work “Lincoln’s Constitution,” “when 
Americans debated sovereignty before the Civil War, they were debating the ultimate locus of 
political authority.”55 The ambiguity of the Founders on the nature of the federal government in 
respect to the states created room for debate, which quickly resulted in a national division 
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between those who supported sweeping national powers and those who advocated for state 
rights.
56
  
In light of the unsteady relationship between the federal government and the states, the 
presidents preceding Lincoln encouraged citizens to avoid controversial issues, particularly the 
institution of slavery. These cautious presidents sought to maintain the status quo by 
discouraging controversial discourse between states. In his Farewell Address, Andrew Jackson 
proclaimed that the American republic had proved itself to be a superior form of government in 
that “our country has improved and is flourishing beyond any former example in the history of 
nation.”57  To maintain this progress, Jackson urged the American people to “avoid everything 
calculated to wound the sensibility or offend the just pride of the people of other States, and they 
should frown upon any proceedings within their own borders likely to disturb the tranquility of 
their political brethren in other portions of the Union.”58 Jackson argued that anti-slavery 
advocates were working under the façade of “philanthropic” motives but were actually trying to 
endanger the sovereignty of the states.
59
 In a similar articulation, Martin Van Buren urged the 
American people to follow the example of the Founders in treating interstate controversy with 
“delicacy” and “forbearance.”60  
 As Lincoln approached his presidency, however, the political controversy could no 
longer be avoided through political rhetoric. The instability of the nation-state relationship had 
become undeniable through the controversy of the slavery question. As the nation expanded 
physically with the adoption of additional states, Congress was faced with the unavoidable 
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dilemma of deciding whether or not to extend slavery into those territories.
61
 In an attempt to 
maintain peace between the states that prohibited slavery, “free states,” and states that permitted 
slavery, “slave states,” Congress passed the Missouri Compromise in 1820. Under this 
compromise, all states within the Louisiana Territory, except for Missouri, were to be considered 
“free,” “limiting future expansion of slavery north of a line drawn at thirty-six degrees, thirty 
minutes.”62  
Despite the enactment of the Missouri Compromise, debate over the expansion of slavery 
continued after the Mexican-American war when America won the territories now known as 
California, Utah, Nevada, Arizona and New Mexico.
63
 In debates over whether to permit slavery 
in these states, Southerners responded by threatening to secede from the Union in the event that 
the territories were not considered “slave states.” In turn, the congressional solution, known as 
the Compromise of 1850, sought to satisfy both Northerners and Southerners by admitting 
California as a free state, abolishing slavery in Washington D.C., and allowing slavery in New 
Mexico and Utah.
64
  
Despite efforts to construct concessions over the question of slavery, the regional division 
spurred further disagreements upon which the federal government was forced to take sides. In 
1854, Senator Stephen A. Douglas passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, disregarding the pact made 
in the Missouri Compromise and allowing the new states of Kansas and Nebraska to decide on 
their own whether they were to be considered “free” or “slave” states.65 Opponents of the act 
joined together to form the Republican Party, soon headed by Abraham Lincoln.
66
 With the 
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defiance of the Missouri Compromise and regional tensions rising, the federal government was 
forced to take a position in the debate. As judicial supremacy would entail, the Supreme Court 
was consulted to determine a constitutionally appropriate settlement. As a result of conflicting 
interpretations of the Constitution, Abraham Lincoln challenged the judicial supremacy of the 
Court.  
 
Dred Scott v. Popular Constitutionalism 
 
Up until the 1850’s, the Supreme Court had managed to stay relatively removed from the 
issue of slavery.
67
 In 1851, the Court set forth their first stance on the slavery question, giving the 
power to determine the status of personhood to each state respectfully in Strader v. Graham.
68
 
As argued by McCloskey, Strader caused very little backlash because Kentucky, the state 
involved, was a slave state and the extension of slavery was unaffected by the decision. In turn, 
the Supreme Court’s decision did not endanger its “carefully nurtured prestige.”69  
In 1856, however, the Supreme Court encountered the case that would ultimately reveal the 
Court’s position on the question of slavery. In the late eighteenth century, an African American 
man named Dred Scott was born enslaved to Peter Blow of Virginia. In 1818, the Blow family 
moved with Scott to Saint Louis, Missouri where he was sold to Dr. John Emerson. Under the 
ownership of Emerson, Dred Scott was moved further to Illinois and then the Wisconsin 
Territory, both of which were considered areas where slavery was prohibited.
70
 During his stay 
in these territories, however, Scott never took action as a free man. Instead, Scott filed suit 
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against his owners after being moved back to Missouri, claiming that he had achieved the status 
of a free man upon entering Wisconsin.
71
 
In response to Dred Scott’s suit, Chief Justice Roger Taney delivered arguably the most 
controversial decision ever rendered by the Supreme Court. In his opinion, Taney established the 
judicial rule that Dred Scott, as an African American, had no right to bring a suit in federal court 
because he was not a United States citizen. The Framers, he argued, never intended to include 
African Americans within the constitutional clause “people of the United States” nor in the 
Declaration of Independence’s “all men are created equal”.72 In fact, Taney claimed, African 
Americans were “so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to 
respect.”73 Concluding his opinion, Taney ruled that Congress violated the Due Process Clause 
of the 5
th
 amendment in passing the Missouri Compromise because the legislation infringed upon 
slaveholders’ right to property.74 
Chief Justice Taney based his ruling in Dred Scott on the theory of judicial supremacy. In 
deciding that both African Americans were not United States citizens and that the Missouri 
Compromise was unconstitutional, Taney created judicial rules that he expected all actors, 
political and nonpolitical, to follow. By invalidating a congressional action, the Missouri 
Compromise, Taney practiced judicial review. He assumed, in making that decision that 
Congress would comply with the Court’s opinion and either discard the legislation or change it 
to conform to the standards set out by Taney.  
Thus, prior to Lincoln’s presidency, the Dred Scott decision placed Lincoln in direct 
opposition with the Court, acting as precursor to a future relationship of constitutional 
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disagreement. When Dred Scott was announced on March 6
th
, 1857, Lincoln was running as the 
Republican candidate for senator of Illinois against Stephen A. Douglas.
75
 As a result of the vast 
implications of the decision, Dred Scott acted as a primary topic of discussion in the debates 
between Lincoln and Douglas.  
Lincoln’s challenge to Dred Scott employed the theory of popular constitutionalism. As an 
American citizen, Lincoln believed it was his duty to interpret the Constitution as it was the duty 
of all other people. Gary Jacobson argues, “Lincoln’s response, to ignore the decision as a 
political rule, was predicated on the view that those sworn to uphold the Constitution have an 
obligation to advance the cause of constitutional principle, to the end of realizing the ideals of 
the Declaration of Independence.”76 In defending his conflicting opinion with the Dred Scott 
decision, Lincoln maintained that the American people were the only body that could decide the 
finality of constitutional questions. 
In confronting the Judiciary, Lincoln did not attack the role of the Court but the finality of 
their decision. Instead of questioning the Court’s role in settling constitutional questions, Lincoln 
argued that there was a distinction between settled and unsettled judgments. In his first public 
reaction to the Dred Scott ruling, Lincoln criticized the Court’s interpretation of Dred Scott by 
explaining a series of flaws within the decision, which he argued made it “erroneous.”77 In his 
evaluation, Lincoln explicated that judicial decisions could only apply to “general policy” when 
they were “fully settled,” creating his own rule for appropriate disagreement with the Court.78 
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Lincoln found Dred Scott to be especially problematic because it lacked the support of a 
unified Court.  Emphasizing his argument during his Speech at Springfield, Lincoln pointed out 
that Dred Scott was “made by a divided court-dividing differently on the different points.”79 Of 
the eight justices who adjudicated on the case, half of them disagreed with Taney. The most 
powerful of these disagreements came in the form of Justice Curtis’s dissenting opinion. In his 
dissent, Curtis argued that, in contradiction to Taney’s ruling, Dred Scott was a United States 
citizen. Utilizing article II, section I of the Constitution, which states that “no person except a 
natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this 
Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President,” Curtis argued that African Americans 
were considered citizens at the time of enactment.  In light of the five states under the Articles of 
Confederation granting free African Americans the right to vote, Curtis reasoned that the 
Founders did understand African Americans to be citizens.
80
 Upon establishing this point, Curtis 
further discredited Taney’s opinion by highlighting Dred Scott’s supposed lack of standing. In 
the event that Scott did not have the right to sue, as Taney had claimed, Curtis argued that 
Taney’s sweeping opinion would be considered invalid.81 By highlighting the historical and 
logical flaws in Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion, Curtis’s dissent demonstrated Lincoln’s 
claim of judicial discord. 
In light of his claims as to the unsettled nature of Dred Scott, Lincoln argued that the finality 
of the case belonged to the people. In his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln defends his assertion 
by defining the jurisdiction of the Court over constitutional questions,  
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decided 
by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case upon 
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the parties to a suit as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high 
respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government. 
And while it is obviously possible that such decisions may be erroneous in any given case, 
still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it 
may be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than 
could the evils of a different practice. At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that 
if the policy of the government upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be 
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary 
litigation between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own 
rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that 
eminent tribunal.
82
  
In his argument, Lincoln emphasized that in cases of vital importance or decisions involving 
substantive matter, the American people maintained the right to question the binding nature of 
the Court’s judgment just as Lincoln did in response to Dred Scott. In his work, Jacobson 
expands on this argument, “in a republican polity the realization of substantive ideals must 
engage the people as active participants in a common quest. The Court may have a special role in 
this process, but it was never intended for it to go it alone.”83 Thus in his challenge to Dred Scott, 
Lincoln championed popular constitutionalism to promote popular dominance over “vital 
questions.”  
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Ex parte Merryman- The Constitutionality of Noncompliance 
 
Although the institution of slavery was not the only source of tension between the North 
and the South during the 1800's, it was certainly a major point of disagreement leading up to the 
Civil War. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott and Abraham Lincoln’s 
victory in the 1860 presidential election, the friction between the two regions could no longer be 
suppressed by congressional compromise. On December 20, 1860, South Carolina was the first 
state to secede from the Union, followed shortly by Georgia, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, 
Louisiana, and Texas.
84
 Thus, by the time Lincoln gave his First Inaugural Address, it was clear 
that the Union had fallen apart and the Confederacy was forming.  
Thus, Lincoln’s presidency was plagued with crises from the start. On December 26, 
1860, Major Anderson moved from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter near Charleston, South 
Carolina sparking Southern hostility as the base was considered Confederate territory.
85
 Tension 
continued to build until the insurrection officially began with the attack of Fort Sumter on April 
12, 1861. The battle was sparked after Lincoln authorized the shipment of supplies to the 
military base.
86
 After two days of fighting amongst Lincoln’s forces and the Confederate rebels, 
the armed forces of the federal government were forced to surrender.
87
 In response to the attack, 
Lincoln issued an executive proclamation, calling for state militias to send 75,000 troops to the 
Capital to crush the rebellion. In the conclusion of his proclamation, Lincoln scheduled a 
congressional convention for July 4
th,
, giving him several months to handle the budding conflict 
alone. It is at this time that Scott M. Matheson Jr. notes that Lincoln began his “twelve weeks of 
                                                        
84
 Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution, 15. 
85
 Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution, 15. 
86
 Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution, 15. 
87
 Scott M. Matheson, Presidential Constitutionalism in Perilous Times (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2009), 34. 
 35 
unilateral president actions.” By April 27 1861, secessionists had consistently impeded Lincoln’s 
Northern militias from entering Washington, D.C. and prompted several brutal riots throughout 
Maryland. In response to the persisting rebellion, Lincoln authorized the Commanding General 
of the United States Army to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, sparking a crucial discrepancy 
between Lincoln and the Court over the constitutionality of his actions.
88
  
The writ, by its terms, provides that all imprisoned persons have the right to petition for a 
review of their arrest before a federal court.
89
 As it had been ingrained in the American legal 
tradition since pre-Revolutionary common law practices, the Framers were careful to include a 
clause within the Constitution, limiting the circumstances by which the writ could be 
suspended.
90
  In Article 1, Section 9 known as the Suspension Clause, the Constitution 
proscribes, “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.”91  
Despite the obvious rebellion occurring against the Union, Lincoln’s suspension of the 
writ was controversial because the majority of the American public believed that the power was 
reserved solely for Congress. Clinton Rossiter elaborates on this controversy, “[The suspension 
of the writ] was done by the President in the face of almost unanimous opinion that the 
constitutional clause regulating the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was directed to 
Congress alone, and that the President did not share in the power of suspension.”92 Thus, Lincoln 
understood the Suspension Clause in contrast to the traditional interpretation that the authority 
belonged to Congress. 
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On May 25, 1861, John Merryman was arrested in Baltimore for committing “acts of 
treason,” which included raising an armed group to fight the federal militias and burning railroad 
bridges to impede their travel.
93
 Almost immediately after his arrest, Merryman’s lawyer, George 
H. Williams constructed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directly from Chief Justice 
Taney.
94
 In response to William’s proposal, Taney issued a federal order to hear Merryman’s 
case.
95
 
On May 27
th
, however, Merryman did not appear before the Chief Justice. Instead, 
Lincoln defied the order of the Court and authorized the continued holding of Merryman.
96
 In 
light of the President’s defiance, Chief Justice Taney constructed an opinion for the case known 
as Ex parte Merryman. In his opinion, Taney declared that “the only power therefore which the 
President possesses, where the “life, liberty, or property” of a private citizen is concerned, is the 
power and duty prescribed in the 3rd section of the 2nd Article, which requires “That he Shall 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.””97 In light of the President’s strict duty to execute 
the laws, Taney argued, “…He is not authorized to execute them himself or through agents or 
officers civil or military appointed by himself, but he is to take care that they be faithfully carried 
into Execution as they are expounded and adjudged of by the Coordinate Branch of the 
Government to which that duty is assigned by the Constitution.”98 Thus, Taney argued, Lincoln 
acted beyond his constitutional duties by suspending the writ and refusing to release Merryman. 
By failing to obey an order made by the federal courts, Taney further contended that Lincoln 
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violated his duty to “faithfully execute” the laws. By challenging judicial supremacy and 
ignoring a federal order, Taney argued that Lincoln exceeded his constitutional limitations. 
In the defense of his challenge to judicial supremacy, President Lincoln employs the 
theory of departmentalism to justify his interpretation. To strengthen his argument, Lincoln 
authorizes his independent understanding of the Suspension clause through the claims of 
executive prerogative and constitutional ambiguity. In his first defense, Lincoln utilizes the 
theory of executive prerogative to explain his use of presidential war powers during his message 
to Congress, 
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed, were being resisted, 
and failing of execution, in nearly one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally 
fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear, that by the use of the means necessary 
to their execution, some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen’s 
liberty, that practically, it relieves more of the guilty, than of the innocent, should, to a 
very limited extent, be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws, but 
one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?
99
 
For Lincoln, the fact that the government was in danger of being “overthrown” and facing an 
insurrection authorized his use of extraordinary powers without congressional approval. In 
making this claim, Lincoln utilized the theory of “executive” or “Lockean” prerogative, 
stemming from John Locke’s “Two Treatises of Government.” On the subject of presidential 
power, Locke writes,  
This Power to act according to discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription 
of the Law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called Prerogative. For since 
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in some Governments the Law-making Power is not always in being, and is usually too 
numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to Execution: and because also it is 
impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities that 
may concern the publick; or to make such Laws, as will do no harm, if they are Executed 
with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all Persons, that may come in their 
way, therefore there is a latitude left to the Executive power, to do many things of choice, 
which the Laws do not prescribe.
100
   
Because the president is a unique position to respond quickly, Locke reasoned that the executive 
must be given flexibility during “accidents and necessities that may concern the publick.” 
Because Congress was not scheduled to convene for months, Lincoln believed that he had the 
right to “act according to discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription of the Law.” 
Therefore, Lincoln utilized executive prerogative as one component in his defense to Congress. 
 After putting forth this argument, however, Lincoln denied making any violation to the 
Constitution, concluding that he did, in fact, have a right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 
Focusing on the lack of clarity within the Suspension Clause, Lincoln utilized the ambiguity of 
the Constitution to defend his conflict with the Court. In applying this theory of defense, Lincoln 
questioned the common belief that the suspension clause was reserved for Congress. Arguing 
that the Constitution was “silent” as to which Federal Department the power belonged to, 
Lincoln upheld his behavior as constitutional.  
A closer analysis of the Constitution is useful for considering Lincoln’s interpretation. 
The section preceding the suspension clause, Article 1, Section 8, outlines the powers of 
Congress including the power to collect taxes, to regulate commerce, and to declare war.
101
 In 
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this section, the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus is not included. One might 
reasonably argue that if the Founders had wanted to reserve the suspension of the writ for 
Congress, they would have placed it within the section outlining the exclusive powers of the 
Legislature. Instead, the Suspension Clause is placed within Article 1, Section 9, which for the 
most part, works to place limitations on Congress.  
In the majority of the clauses of section 9, the Founders made it clear that the text applies 
directly to Congress. For example, the first clause directly includes the word “Congress” in 
limiting the Legislature’s ability to prohibit slavery before 1808.102 Although not explicit, the 
content of the third clause implies that the text is also reserved for Congress. In prohibiting the 
passage of an “ex post facto Law,” the text implicitly addresses the Legislature because law 
making is solely under their authority.
103
 The fifth clause works in much the same way, inferring 
a reserved application to Congress by the nature of the clause, which deals with collection of 
taxes.
104
 However, unlike these clauses, the text of the Suspension Clause never explicitly or 
implicitly reserves the power of suspension to anyone. Thus, in comparison to the surrounding 
clauses, the power to suspend the writ is clearly more ambiguous, giving Lincoln a reasonable 
case to interpret the text in his own way.  
After denying the unconstitutionality of his behavior in suspending the writ, Lincoln 
lastly utilized explicitly the theory of departmentalism to justify his defiance of the Supreme 
Court. On July 5, 1861, Lincoln’s Attorney General Edward Bates issues a statement on his 
behalf, arguing that the Court did not have the authority to review the President’s action, 
…the President, as the chief civil magistrate of the nation, and the most active department 
in the government, is eminently and exclusively political in all his principal functions. As 
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the political chief of the nation, the Constitution charges him with its preservation, 
protection, and defence, and requires him to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 
. . . And the judiciary department has no political powers and claims none, and therefore 
(as well as for other reasons already assigned) no court or judge can take cognizance of 
the political acts of the President, or undertake to revise and reverse his political 
decisions.
105
 
As “co-ordinate departments,” Bates argued, the Executive cannot be subordinate to the 
Judiciary. Therefore, Bates concluded that Lincoln’s noncompliance with the Court was simply 
supporting the premise that all three branches must remain equal in authority.  
 
The Implications of Lincoln’s Challenge 
 
In light of the confrontations between Abraham Lincoln and the Court discussed in this 
chapter, it is clear that both popular constitutionalism and departmentalism played distinct roles 
in the constitutional dialogue of the Civil War period. To defend his alternative interpretations of 
the Constitution, Lincoln employed both the theories as justifications for his challenge to judicial 
supremacy. Although Lincoln achieved success in championing popular constitutionalism in 
questioning Dred Scott, his departmentalist arguments in suspending the writ proved to be 
incompatible with the power dynamics of the time. 
Lincoln’s successful encouragement of popular constitutionalism in his challenge to Dred 
Scott is evident by the enactment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Ratified on 
December 6, 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery within all territories of the 
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United States.
106
 Following shortly, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868, 
officially overturning the Dred Scott decision by granting citizenship to all persons “born or 
naturalized in the United States” and providing them with “equal protection under the laws,” 
particularly applying to former slaves.
107
 Just as Lincoln had contended in his evaluation of the 
decision, the finality of the ruling was reserved for the American people. Thus, in amending the 
Constitution to reverse the decision of Court, the public successfully utilized popular 
constitutionalism.  
Despite his success in promoting popular constitutionalism, however, Lincoln’s 
employment of departmentalism in Ex parte Merryman proved to push the boundaries of his 
executive authority too far. In light of Lincoln’s refusal to obey a judicial order, some scholars 
have dubbed Lincoln’s behavior an act of “executive nullification.” As defined by Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, executive nullification refers to the executive power to void judgments and 
ultimately “means there is no such thing as judicial supremacy: the President has legitimate 
constitutional authority to disregard any judicial decree or precedent he chooses.”108 As this 
theory authorizes presidential defiance, it is largely considered to be dangerous to the separation 
of powers. Paulsen elaborates,  
The virtually unanimous view of the legal community today is that Lincoln and Bates 
carried the logic of coordinacy too far… The prevailing consensus is that Lincoln's 
actions were wrong as a matter of constitutional law, at least in principle: the final 
judgments of the judicial branch must be enforced by the executive; orders of the courts - 
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even orders directed to the President - are the law of the land and must be obeyed and 
enforced. The Merryman power is thus generally thought to be over the line.
109
  
Although Lincoln defended his behavior as a feature of departmentalism, his defiance of a 
judicial order exerted more than independent interpretative authority. By threatening the 
legitimacy of the Court as an institution, Paulsen argues, Lincoln threatened the overall 
legitimacy of the government. 
Other scholars have argued, however, that Lincoln’s defiance of the Court cannot be 
characterized as “executive nullification” because the President received “retroactive 
ratification.” On August 6, 1861, Congress passed legislation approving Lincoln’s war actions, 
“as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the 
Congress of the United States.” In a subsequent congressional session, Congress authorized the 
President to continue to suspend the writ of habeas corpus during the remainder of the 
rebellion.
110
 In light of retrospective congressional approval for Lincoln’s actions, David Gray 
Adler argues that Lincoln’s defiance of the Court must be deemed constitutional.111 In support of 
his claim, Adler reviews Thomas Jefferson’s personal thoughts on retroactive ratification. Adler 
cites Jefferson’s Letter to J.B. Colvin on September 20, 1810,  
The officer who is called to act on this superior ground, does indeed risk himself on the 
justice of the controlling powers of the Constitution, and his station makes it his duty to 
incur that risk. But those controlling powers, and his fellow citizens generally, are bound 
to judge {him} according to the circumstances under which he acted… 
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The line of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the good officer is bound 
to draw it at his own peril, and throw himself on the justices of his country and the 
rectitude of his motives.
112
 
In explicating the historical basis for retroactive ratification, Adler argues that in the case of 
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, Lincoln’s behavior would be considered 
constitutional.  
In addition to receiving “retroactive ratification,” Lincoln’s actions also remained 
unchallenged by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases throughout the Civil War. In the Prize 
Cases, when the constitutionality of Lincoln’s authorization for the blockade of Confederate 
ports was questioned, the Court approved of Lincoln’s response to the insurrection. In the 
majority opinion, Grier writes, “Insurrection against a government may or may not culminate in 
an organized rebellion, but a civil war always begins by insurrection against the lawful authority 
of the Government…The President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without 
waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to it by him or them could 
change the fact.”113 The Court continued to support Lincoln’s suspension of the writ in Ex parte 
Vallandigham when the justices refused to hear the case as it was reserved for the military 
commission.
114
 Only after the war, in the case of Ex parte Milligan, did the Court rule the use of 
military commissions was illegal in regions not involved in “military operations.”115 Thus, the 
Court concluded that in Milligan’s case, “an ordained and establish court was better able to judge 
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of this than a military tribunal composed of gentlemen not trained to the profession of the 
law.”116 
 Lincoln’s interpretation of the Constitution, predicated on departmentalism, was accepted 
as an anomaly. Congress and the Court saw the emergency of the Civil War as a justification for 
his independent interpretation but made clear that it was only warranted under specific 
circumstances. Lincoln’s employment of departmentalism, thus, depicts the difficulty with which 
departmentalist arguments can be employed to challenge judicial supremacy. Even in the midst 
of civil war, Lincoln received substantial opposition to his conception that the Executive could 
independently interpret the Constitution. 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt v. The Hughes Court 
 
Chapter Three 
 
 
Just as Abraham Lincoln was elected to office at the brink of the American Civil War, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, too, entered his presidency at the height of a national crisis. And just as 
Lincoln saw himself in need of unprecedented executive authority in handling the conflict, 
Roosevelt also believed that the extraordinary circumstances of his time required flexibility in 
constitutional powers. In the midst of America’s greatest economic emergency, the Great 
Depression, Roosevelt took his oath and pledged his loyalty to the nation, promising to end 
economic suffering and restore prosperity to the American people. To do this, Roosevelt and 
Congress would enact emergency measures that in ordinary times would not have passed 
constitutional muster. In their attempt to reconstruct the economic policy upheld by the Supreme 
Court, Roosevelt and Congress were met with judicial opposition, consisting of a series of 
legislative invalidations that Robert McCloskey refers to as “the most ambitious dragon-fight in 
its long and checkered history.”117 In response to the Court’s asserted dominance over economic 
policy, Roosevelt employs the theories of popular constitutionalism and departmentalism to 
confront the Judiciary in a time of heightened judicial supremacy. 
 
Historical Foundations of Constitutional Controversy 
 
Known as the “laissez faire” era, the early 1900’s became defined by the notorious 
Lochner v. New York case in which the Supreme Court established that limitations on labor hours 
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violated the “liberty of contract” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.118 The 
implications of the case were extensive, sparking an era of economic conservatism that was 
enforced by continued judicial precedent. According to David O’Brien, “For four decades (from 
1897 to 1937) the philosophy of laissez-faire capitalism and defensive stand against special 
interests’ protective legislation held sway with a majority of the Court under Chief Justices 
Waite, Melville Fuller (1888-1910), Edward White (1910-1921), William Howard Taft (1921-
1930), and Charles Evans Hughes (1930-1941). Never before or since were economic regulations 
more severely scrutinized.”119 Thus, when encountered with the crisis of the Great Depression, 
the Supreme Court was dominated by the conservative ideology of the Lochner era and 
accustomed to invalidating government regulation of business.  
As the Great Depression approached, however, the ideological composition of the Court 
encountered greater variance, creating a frequently divided Judiciary. Two ideological blocs 
made up the New Deal Court that emerged. The first consisted of four conservative justices 
known as “The Four Horsemen”, including Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland, and 
Butler. The other ideological bloc consisted of three liberal-minded justices including Justices 
Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo.
120
 The two remaining justices, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice 
Roberts were considered moderate conservatives and were therefore frequently swing voters.
121
 
The divided nature of the Court provided a foundation for constitutional disagreement both 
amongst the justices themselves and with other political actors such as President Roosevelt. 
At the onset of the Depression, the justices appeared divided in their understanding of 
emergency powers. In the case Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, the two 
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ideological blocs of the Court presented contrasting opinions on the use of extraordinary powers 
in times of crisis. The Court considered a Minnesota state law that provided mortgage relief by 
extending the time in which the debt must be repaid.
122
 Arguing that the legislation was 
unconstitutional, the plaintiff claimed that the state had violated Article I, Section 10, the 
Contract Clause, by interfering in his private contract.
 123
 In the 5-4-majority opinion, Chief 
Justice Hughes concluded that the law was constitutional because the economic emergency 
necessitated the use of the state’s police power over the “contract clause,” reasoning that 
mortgage relief worked to “protect the vital interests of the community.”124  Thus Hughes 
established, “that although an emergency may not call into life a power which has never lived, 
nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already 
enjoyed.”125 In the dissenting opinion, however, the conservative justices argued that the 
economic emergency did not warrant the amplification of constitutional power. Representing the 
dissenters, Justice Sutherland argued, “The present exigency is nothing new. From the beginning 
of our existence as a nation, periods of depression, of industrial failure, of financial distress, of 
unpaid and unpayable indebtedness, have alternated with years of plenty.” For the conservative 
members of the Court, the emergency did not excuse a person’s responsibility to pay their bills. 
Instead, Sutherland argued,  
“The vital lesson that expenditure beyond income begets poverty, that public or private 
extravagance, financed by promises to pay, either must end in complete or partial 
repudiation or the promises be fulfilled by self-denial and painful effort, though 
constantly taught by bitter experience, seems never to be learned, and the attempt by 
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legislative devices to shift the misfortune of the debtor to the shoulders of the creditor 
without coming into conflict with the contract impairment clause has been persistent and 
oft-repeated.”126 
Sutherland’s opinion demonstrated the conservative ideology of the Court by discouraging 
government interference in private business. The disagreement amongst the justices over the 
Minnesota state law revealed that the justices did not fundamentally agree on how the 
Constitution should be interpreted to account for the Depression.  
As the Depression wore on, however, the justices appeared to come to a consensus. In 
Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, the justices agreed that emergencies did not 
warrant the expansion of constitutional powers. As Chief Justice Hughes explicated on behalf of 
a unanimous Court,  
Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power. The Constitution 
established a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have 
proved to be both in war and peace, but these powers of the national government are 
limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to 
transcend the imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is 
necessary.
127
 
Despite their disagreement in the case previously mentioned, it clear that by 1935 when the 
Schechter case was decided, the justices agreed that the economic emergency facing the nation 
could not justify the expansion of constitutional powers. To meet the needs of the Depression, 
the Court argued, the Constitution must be interpreted in the same way it had been in the years 
leading up to crisis. 
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The Great Depression and Extraordinary Circumstances 
 
On March 4
th
, 1933, Roosevelt focused his first Inaugural Address on the dire economic 
problems at hand,  
Values have shrunken to fantastic levels; taxes have risen; our ability to pay has fallen; 
government of all kinds is faced by serious curtailment of income; the means of exchange are 
frozen in the currents of trade; the withered leaves of industrial enterprise lie on every side; 
farmers find no markets for their produce; the savings of many years in thousands of families 
are gone. More important, a host of unemployed citizens face the grim problem of existence, 
and an equally great number toil with little return. Only a foolish optimist can deny the dark 
realities of the moment.
128
 
Roosevelt’s description was accurate. Following the crash of the stock market in 1929, the 
American economy spiraled completely out of control. The production rate in factories dropped 
more than 50 percent, as steel plants functioned at 12 percent of their potential capacity.
129
 By 
the time Roosevelt was elected, 5,000 banks had declared bankruptcy, two million people had 
lost their homes and 13 million people were considered unemployed.
130
 The Great Depression 
had left the entire world “profoundly depressed, economically and psychologically.”131 
As Roosevelt continued to explain in his Inaugural Address, the effects of the Depression 
had created a nationwide state of emergency that could only be met with swift government 
action. Comparing the current economic state to a state of war, the President urged the Federal 
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departments to work in collaboration with one another to restore economic stability. Introducing 
his program of government intervention, Roosevelt declared, 
Our greatest primary task is to put people to work. This is no unsolvable problem if we 
face it wisely and courageously. It can be accomplished in part by direct recruiting by the 
Government itself, treating the task as we would treat the emergency of a war, but at the 
same time, through this employment, accomplishing greatly needed projects to stimulate 
and reorganize the use of our natural resources.
132
  
For the President, economic suffering had to be countered by a unified government force, similar 
to the cooperation exercised during times of war.  
In his approach to economic recovery, Roosevelt employed the theories of 
departmentalism and popular constitutionalism to create a series of economic programs to aid 
specific sectors of the economy. These programs constituted his legislative agenda, which was 
termed the “New Deal.” Roosevelt applied the theory of departmentalism by working with 
Congress to equally interpret the scope of the government’s constitutionally provided power, 
particularly in times of economic emergency. In drafting and proposing regulatory programs, 
Roosevelt believed that both the executive and the legislature were capable of determining the 
meaning of Congress’s constitutional powers. Unlike Lincoln who believed that the emergency 
of the Civil War required immediate executive action, Roosevelt saw the Depression as a crisis 
in which all three branches must respond to together. Roosevelt frequently employed the image 
of the government as a “three-horse team provided by the Constitution to the American people so 
that their field might by plowed.” Thus, Roosevelt, calling Congress immediately into special 
session, viewed all three departments of government equally obligated to protect the people and 
equally qualified to determine the meaning of that obligation. 
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In creating his “New Deal” legislation, Roosevelt also utilized the theory of popular 
constitutionalism. In light of his recent election, the President saw himself as the chosen leader 
of the people and thus, the representative of their will. In his Inaugural Address, Roosevelt 
declares himself as the leader of “this great army of our people dedicated to a disciplined attack 
upon our common problems.”133 Thus, Roosevelt promised to use his constitutional powers to 
take care of the people, “I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures 
that a stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may require. These measures, or such other 
measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and wisdom, I shall seek, within my 
constitutional authority, to bring to speedy adoption.”134 Roosevelt saw his relief programs as a 
reflection of what the people wanted and more importantly, what the people needed. Thus, in his 
interpretation of the Constitution in creating the “New Deal,” Roosevelt believed himself to 
represent the people’s interpretation of the text. 
Despite his intention to unite the federal departments and represent the people’s will, 
Roosevelt’s approach to economic recovery raised serious constitutional questions. As Roosevelt 
applied the theories of departmentalism and popular constitutionalism, the Supreme Court 
simultaneously upheld the theory of judicial supremacy to assess and determine the validity of 
Roosevelt’s legislation. The interpretational discrepancies over his legislative agenda culminated 
in Roosevelt’s notorious challenge against the Supreme Court known as his “Court-packing 
plan.” As this chapter will demonstrate, departmentalism and popular constitutionalism not only 
played a vital role in the creation of these programs, but also in Roosevelt’s attack on judicial 
supremacy.  
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The “New Deal” and Judicial Supremacy 
 
The source of conflict between President Roosevelt and the Supreme Court are rooted in 
the fundamental constitutional disagreements between the two departments. In contrast with the 
Court, Roosevelt understood the Constitution to be a flexible document, in which the text could 
be narrowed or broadened to meet the needs of any existing situation. Roosevelt described his 
constitutional understanding in the conclusion of his First Inaugural Address, “Our Constitution 
is so simple and practical that it is possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in 
emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form.”135  
Roosevelt’s political philosophy functioned on the primary belief “that the government 
ought to help the people in distress.”136 In holding that as true, the President believed that the 
Constitution had the flexibility to grant the government the ability to “try new remedies for the 
failing economy.”137 Thus, Roosevelt’s “New Deal” utilized broad constitutional powers to 
target four main areas of economic concern: the crash of the financial sector, rising 
unemployment, the lack of an effective “safety net”, and the lack of industrial regulations. 
Although the Court challenged important components of the New Deal, the Judiciary did not 
take up issue with all four areas of the President’s agenda. Instead, with the exception of 
regulatory legislation, the Court practiced judicial restraint when adjudicating on Roosevelt’s 
legislation. 
When the President’s policies to restore the financial sector were brought before the 
Court, the majority opinion ultimately consented to his approach, although narrowly in regards to 
the removal of the gold standard. Roosevelt’s financial legislation commenced with the 
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Emergency Banking Act, effectively shutting down, inspecting and reopening thousands of 
banks nationwide to restore public confidence in the banking system.
138
 Roosevelt followed this 
“bank holiday” with a proposal to combat deflation by cancelling all gold clauses within public 
and private contracts, prompting the 1933 Joint Resolution removing all gold obligations.
139
  
While Roosevelt’s banking legislation remained unchallenged by the Court, the 
President’s invalidation of the gold clause spurred opposition resulting in the Gold Clause Cases. 
Although several Court justices expressed personal concern over the implications of the 
legislation
140, the Judiciary ultimately upheld Roosevelt’s policy. In the first of the cases, 
Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., the Court held that Congress had the authority to 
regulate the value of money and that congressional power could not be diminished by private 
contracts.
141
 In the second case, however, the Court offered a more aggressive opinion, 
concluding that the congressional Joint Resolution was unconstitutional. Upon declaring its 
unconstitutionality, however, the Court refused to adjudicate on the case due to the plaintiff’s 
lack of standing.
142
 Despite objections to the constitutionality of Roosevelt’s financial recovery 
program, the Court ultimately conceded to the President’s interpretation of congressional power. 
By upholding the congressional action in Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co and 
refusing to make a ruling in Perry v. United States, the Court demonstrated judicial restraint.  
 Similarly, the Court gave the President authority to enact programs designed to increase 
the employment rate and create a social safety net. To confront rising unemployment, Roosevelt 
and his advisors proposed the creation of numerous agencies designed to employ more people on 
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public works such as the Civil Conservation Corps (CCC), the Civil Works Administration 
(CWA), the Public Works Administration (PWA), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and 
the Works Progress Administration (WPA).
143
 In response to these employment programs, the 
Court adjudicated favorably. When the TVA was brought before the Court in Ashwander v. TVA, 
for example, the majority emphasized the importance of judicial self-restraint by avoiding ruling 
on the constitutionality of the entire program.
144
 Despite articulating their desire to avoid the 
constitutional question, however, the Court judged in favor of the program.
145
 Thus, the Court 
practiced a degree of restraint in reviewing the authority of the President and Congress to enact 
legislation geared toward recovering the employment rate. Similarly, the Court upheld 
Roosevelt’s Social Security Act, which worked to establish a stable pension system for the 
elderly upon retirement.
146
 Confirming the constitutionality of the legislation under a broad 
interpretation of the “general welfare” clause, the Court also practiced a high degree of judicial 
restraint in the area of social security.
147
 
Roosevelt’s fourth area of legislation, the regulation of industry, however, proved too 
constitutionally problematic for the Court to ignore with avoidance or restraint. The President’s 
strategy to implement economic regulations, using the congressional power to regulate 
commerce “among the several states,”148 conflicted with the Court’s evolving understanding of 
the interstate-intrastate commerce dichotomy. As a result of the conflicting interpretations 
between the Court and Roosevelt over the scope of interstate commerce, three major New Deal 
                                                        
143
 Solomon, FDR v. The Constitution, 37-39. 
144
 O’Brien Constitutional Law and Politics, 165, 171 
145
 Jeff Shesol, Supreme Power: Franklin Roosevelt vs. The Supreme Court (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2010), 221. 
146
 Solomon, FDR v. The Constitution, 203.  
147
 Solomon, FDR v. The Constitution, 204. 
148
 U.S. Constitution, Art.1, Sect. 8. 
 55 
programs were nullified including the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), the Agriculture 
Adjustment Act (AAA), and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act. 
Beginning in the later half of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court had begun to 
limit congressional control over commercial activity by defining commerce more narrowly.
149
  In 
the opinion of United States v. E.C. Knight Company, Chief Justice Fuller established two tests 
to narrow the domain of congressional regulation. The first test limited the authority of federal 
regulation to activities involved in the transportation of commerce. Thus, activities involved in 
the production of commerce fell under the jurisdiction of the States.
150
 The second test 
established a distinction between “direct” and “indirect” effects on commerce, concluding that 
economic regulations could not be instituted unless the targeted activity had a clear and 
purposeful effect on commerce.
151
 
 In light of these rules created to narrow the definition of interstate commerce, three of 
Roosevelt’s regulatory programs were invalidated. The first of the three programs to be nullified 
was the NIRA, a program orchestrated by the National Recovery Administration (NRA) under 
the Commerce Clause. By regulating minimum wages, maximum hours, and production quotas, 
the program worked to implement and enforce calculated “industrial codes.”152 The functionality 
of the program, however, raised economic concerns. As explained by Conrad Black, “The basic 
problem of the NIRA and the National Recovery Administration (NRA) which implemented it 
was that they provided an incentive to raise prices and wages, but raising the two together would 
not raise employment, shrink unemployment, or raise profits and therefore dividends or 
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investment.”153 In light of the complications of the NIRA, the program was brought before the 
Supreme Court. In the case of Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, the Court struck 
down the code-making component of NIRA and ultimately the entire program, arguing that it 
was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive.
154
 In addition, the Court 
also determined that the program was an invalid utilization of the commerce clause. Because 
they sold their products locally, the Court argued, the Schechter Corporation had no “direct” 
effect on interstate commerce and could not be regulated by the federal government.
155
 
The second of the New Deal programs struck down by the Supreme Court was the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act. Enacted under the congressional taxing power, the AAA was 
designed to stabilize the agricultural sector through production quotas. In exchange for abiding 
by the established quotas, farmers received government subsidies funded through imposed taxes 
on “cotton mills, beef packagers, and other processors of whatever the farmers produced.”156 
During the summer of 1935, “about five new lawsuits were filed each day against the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act alone. During this period, more than 100 district court judges held 
acts of Congress unconstitutional; federal courts issued more than 1,600 injunctions blocking the 
enforcement of New Deal laws.”157 Although the program had successfully brought relief to 
farmers, saving many from bankruptcy and increasing the prices of farm goods, it also infuriated 
companies that processed farm goods as they were funding the program through a newly 
imposed tax.
158
 When the program was brought before the Court in United States v. Butler, the 
Court invalidated the AAA, ruling that the program was an invalid use of the commerce clause 
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concealed under the taxing power. In the majority opinion, Justice Roberts explained, “We 
conclude that the act is one regulating agricultural production, that the tax is a mere incident of 
such regulation…”159 Due to the “local” nature of agriculture, the Court determined that 
regulation of the agricultural sector must be reserved for the states.
160
 
The last of the New Deal programs invalided by the Supreme Court was the Bituminous 
Coal Conservation Act. Similar to the NIRA, the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act established 
industrial codes designed specifically for the coal industry.
161
 In the case nullifying the 
legislation Carter v. Carter Coal Company, the Court established a more narrow definition of 
“direct” effect on commerce, further limiting the scope of congressional authority over the 
economy. In the majority opinion, Justice Sutherland writes,  
The word “direct” implies that the activity or condition invoked or blamed shall operate 
proximately-not mediately, remotely, or collaterally- to produce the effect. It connotes the 
absence of an efficient intervening agency or condition. And the extent of the effect bears 
no logical relation to its character. The distinction between a direct and an indirect effect 
turns, not upon the magnitude of either the case or effect, but merely upon the manner in 
which the effect has been brought about. If the production by one man of a single ton of 
coal intended for interstate sale and shipment…affects interstate commerce indirectly, the 
effect does not become direct by multiplying the tonnage, or increasing the number of 
men employed, or adding to the expense or complexities of the business, or by all 
combined.
162
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By arguing that the “magnitude” of the impact was irrelevant to definition of “direct” effect on 
commerce, Sutherland created a rule that further narrowed the authority of the federal 
government to regulate the economy. In doing so, the Court directly challenged the agenda of 
Roosevelt and Congress in providing economic relief. In turn, the nullification of the President’s 
three major New Deal programs acted as a clear exposition of judicial supremacy. 
 
Popular Constitutionalism and the Election of 1936 
 
After the Court had dealt its blows to the President’s regulatory agenda, it was clear that 
judicial supremacy had defeated any arguments Franklin D. Roosevelt had made in defense of 
his constitutional interpretation. The Court had ruled that three major New Deal programs were 
unconstitutional and thus, the New Deal programs were eradicated. Judicial supremacy had 
prevailed. But the constitutional disagreement between the two departments did dissolve with the 
legislation. Roosevelt took the opportunity in his response to the Court’s invalidations to launch 
his assault on the judicial supremacy of the Court. In order to delegitimize the Judiciary, 
Roosevelt utilized the theory of popular constitutionalism by encouraging greater public 
awareness of case rulings and political participation in the upcoming election.  
Following the Court’s announcement of Schechter, Roosevelt was given a public forum 
to express his reaction by way of a press conference. In his reply to the invalidation of the NIRA, 
Roosevelt encouraged popular constitutionalism by urging the American people to pay attention 
to the decisions of the Court and understand their vast implications. To promote a heightened 
awareness, Roosevelt compared the damaging implications of Schechter to those of Dred Scott, a 
case that ultimately resulted in a civil war, 
 59 
For the benefit of those of you who haven’t read it through, I think I can put it this way: 
that the implications of this decision are much more important than almost certainly any 
decision of my lifetime or yours, more important than any decision probably since the 
Dred Scott case, because they bring the country as a whole up against a very practical 
question. That is in spite of what one gentleman said in the paper this morning, that I 
resented the decision. Nobody resents a Supreme Court decision. You can deplore a 
Supreme Court decision and you can point out the effect of it. You can call the attention 
of the country to what the implications are as to the future, what the results of that 
decision are if future decisions follow this decision.
163
 
Upon instructing the American public to consider the implications of the Court’s opinion in 
Schechter, Roosevelt argued that the Court had reverted to a “horse-and-buggy definition of 
interstate commerce.”164 By urging the public to pay attention to the Court’s decision and its 
implications, Roosevelt emphasized the consequences of judicial opinions on the American 
people as a whole. In light of these consequences, Roosevelt argued that public has a right to 
consider and disagree with the Court’s behavior as it directly impacts their lives. In alerting the 
public to the harmful ramifications of Schechter, Roosevelt attempted to incite the rise of popular 
constitutionalism to combat the judicial supremacy that killed his legislation. 
In a later reaction to the invalidation of his regulatory legislation, Roosevelt once again 
urged the public to consider the implications of the judicial decisions. By nullifying his 
regulations, Roosevelt argued, the Judiciary crafted a conservative economic policy,  
 It seems to be fairly clear, as a result of this decision and former decisions, using this 
question of minimum wage as an example, that the "no-man's-land" where no 
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Government—State or Federal—can function is being more clearly defined. A State 
cannot do it, and the Federal Government cannot do it. I think, from the layman's point of 
view, that is the easiest way of putting it and about all we can say on it.
165
 
Thus, Roosevelt believed that the Court was making policy by determining what the government 
should and should not interfere with. In turn, Roosevelt responded by addressing the people, 
“…the only thing I can say is that it will be and is of very great interest to practically everybody 
in the United States. They should read all three opinions.”166 Just as he had handled the 
Schechter decision, the President replied to further invalidations by advising the people to read 
the decisions and understand their meaning.  
 In his efforts to promote popular constitutionalism, Roosevelt understood the election of 
1936 to be a defining moment for constitutional interpretation. As a direct representation of the 
will of the American people, the election would provide a clear demonstration of public support, 
or lack there of, for Roosevelt’s policies. Thus in his campaign efforts, Roosevelt makes it clear 
that upon his re-election, he will continue to pursue New Deal-type programs regardless of the 
Court’s invalidations. In his final campaign speech in November 1936, Roosevelt explicitly 
spells out his objectives for the following four years,  
Of course we will continue to seek to improve working conditions for the workers of 
America-to reduce hours over-long, to increase wages that spell starvation, to end the labor 
of children, to wipe out sweatshops….  
Of course we will continue every effort to end monopoly in business, to support collective 
bargaining, to stop unfair competition, to abolish dishonorably trade practices. For all these 
we have only just begun to fight….  
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Of course we will continue to work for cheaper electricity in the homes and farms of 
America…. 
Of course we will continue our efforts in behalf of the farmers of America… 
Of course we will provide useful work for the needy unemployed.
167
 
In light of the Court’s recent nullifications, Roosevelt’s promises to “improve working 
conditions” and “end monopoly in business” reveal that the President intended to create further 
legislation to regulate industry regardless of the precedents set by the Court. Thus, for Roosevelt, 
the election would demonstrate whether Americans approved of his constitutional interpretation 
and wished him to challenge the Court or sided with the Judiciary and desired judicial supremacy 
to be upheld.  
The argument that the election would serve as clear indication of popular will was reiterated 
by former president Herbert Hoover in his opposition to the Roosevelt’s re-election. In his 
critique of the President, Hoover called the New Deal an “attack upon free institutions,” arguing 
that the Supreme Court justices remained “true to their oaths to support the Constitution” and 
“saved us temporarily” by invalidating key components. 168 In light of the approaching election, 
Hoover urged the American people to vote against Roosevelt in order move the nation from “a 
system of personal centralized government to the ideals of liberty.”169 Thus, just as Roosevelt 
saw the election as an indication of public support, Hoover believed the election would serve as a 
demonstration of public disapproval of Roosevelt’s agenda. 
On November 3, 1936, the American public could not have made their preferences more 
clear. In the one the greatest landslide victories of the nation’s history, Roosevelt had defeated 
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his political opponent with 61 percent of the popular vote, taking 46 states and becoming one of 
the most popular presidents of American history.
170
 As the theory of popular constitutionalism 
entails, the election served as an undisputed verification of the public’s support for the New Deal 
and Roosevelt’s understanding of the Constitution.  
 
Departmentalism and Restructuring the Judiciary 
 
In his second presidential term, President Roosevelt modified his approach to judicial 
supremacy, utilizing the recent election to support his departmentalist arguments. With the newly 
evident approval of the American people, Roosevelt felt confident championing the independent 
constitutional interpretations of both the Legislative and Executive branches. In his State of the 
Union address, Roosevelt proclaimed,  
The United States of America, within itself, must continue the task of making democracy 
succeed. In that task the Legislative branch of our Government will, I am confident, continue 
to meet the demands of democracy whether they relate to the curbing of abuses, the extension 
of help to those who need help, or the better balancing of our interdependent economies. So, 
too, the Executive branch of the Government must move forward in this task, and, at the 
same time, provide better management for administrative action of all kinds. The Judicial 
branch also is asked by the people to do its part in making democracy successful [emphasis 
added]. We do not ask the Courts to call non-existent powers into being, but we have a right 
to expect that conceded powers or those legitimately implied shall be made effective 
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instruments for the common good. The process of our democracy must not be imperiled by 
the denial of essential powers of free government.
171
 
In urging the Judiciary to conform to the constitutional interpretation understood by the 
Executive and Legislative branches, Roosevelt makes it clear that all three branches have equal 
authority over the Constitution. With the approval of the public, the President determines that 
popular constitutionalism necessitates that the Judiciary alter its constitutional understanding. 
Upon championing the three branches as equal interpreters, however, Roosevelt pushes 
the boundaries of departmentalism too far. To weaken the dominating authority of the Supreme 
Court, Roosevelt attempts to alter the structure of the judicial branch under the rationale that it 
will improve the productivity of the department. In presenting his plan to the American public 
and Congress on February 5, 1937, Roosevelt argued that the justices were too old to manage 
their workload. In light of the continuing increase in the “volume, importance, and complexity” 
of cases put before the Court, Roosevelt reasoned that there must be an additional judge for all 
justices over the age of seventy to improve the efficiency of the Judiciary.
172
  
In addition to justifying the plan as a means of structural improvement, Roosevelt also 
admitted his intent to reconstruct the jurisprudence of the conservative Court. In his famous 
“fireside chat,” Roosevelt defended the “court-packing plan” as a mode of “saving” the Court,173  
We have, therefore, reached the point as a Nation where we must take action to save the 
Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself. We must find a way to take an appeal 
from the Supreme Court to the Constitution itself. We want a Supreme Court which will do 
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justice under the Constitution- not over it. In our courts we want a government of laws and 
not of men.
174
  
For Roosevelt, the Supreme Court had violated their duty to uphold the Constitution by 
invalidating the New Deal programs. Thus, Roosevelt depicts his plan as restorative, ensuring the 
American people that “This plan of mine is no attack on the Court; it seeks to restore the Court to 
its rightful and historic place in our system of constitutional government and to have it resume its 
high task of building anew on the Constitution “a system of living law.”175 In his plan to modify 
the structure of the Court, however, Roosevelt obstructed the confines of departmentalism. As 
the president, he was awarded limited space to interpret the Constitution. As the election of 1936 
had indicated, the New Deal fell into that designed sphere of authority. However, modifying the 
ideology of the Court to fit the political climate of the moment breached the theory of 
departmentalism. In light of this obstruction of power, Roosevelt encountered a high degree of 
opposition.  
 
Judicial Supremacy Upheld 
 
Despite Roosevelt’s persistent defense of the court-packing plan, the scheme was ultimately 
destroyed in Congress. After months of debate and open opposition, the bill was sent back to 
committee where the provision to add additional justices was discarded.
176
 With the 
abandonment of the plan, it was clear that judicial supremacy had survived Roosevelt’s 
challenge. The reasons for this can be attributed to two events: the overwhelming backlash 
against Roosevelt’s plan and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937. 
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 In response to the Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, political and non-political actors alike 
came to the defense of judicial supremacy. As to be expected, Republican congressmen 
immediately voiced their opposition to the plan. More damaging, however, was the emerging 
disapproval by the Democratic Party led by Senator Burton Wheeler. Comparing the President’s 
plan to the strategies used by notorious dictators, Wheeler argued that Roosevelt violated the 
bounds of his authority,  
Why should we be zealous about this cause? When we look at world affairs we realize that in 
Germany there is a dictator, under whose iron heel are 70,000,000 people. How did he come 
into power? On what plea did he come into office? He came in under the constitution of 
Germany. Every step that was taken by him at first was taken in a constitutional way. Mr. 
Hitler acted "to meet the needs of the times.
177
 
In addition to congressional opposition, the Court itself responded to the plan with expected 
disapproval. In a letter addressed to Senator Wheeler, Chief Justice Hughes argued that 
Roosevelt’s accusations as to the inefficiency of the judicial system were simply inaccurate,  
I think it safe to say that about 60 per cent of the applications for certiorari are wholly 
without merit and ought never to have been made. There are probably about 20 per cent 
or so in addition which have a fair degree of plausibility but which fail to survive critical 
examination. The remainder, falling short, I believe, of 20 per cent, show substantial 
grounds and are granted. I think that it is the view of the members of the court that if any 
error is made in dealing with these applications it is on the side of liberality.
178
 
The plan also encountered popular opposition due to the deeply problematic undertone of the 
strategy. For many, Roosevelt was simply trying to restructure the Court to adhere to his political 
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policies. According to Solomon, “there was something hallowed in the only institution of 
government unblemished by the people. A 1936 opinion poll had found that nearly twice as 
many Americans believed that the Supreme Court protected them against rash legislation than 
worried that it was blocking the popular will.”179 Although the concept that justices determined 
the meaning of law was controversial, the idea that a President could dictate constitutional 
meaning was even more alarming for Americans. In response, Senator Josiah W. Bailey of North 
Carolina argued that in undermining the Court, the President undermined the Constitution,  
The Court and the Constitution:- They stand to fall together. The Constitution creates the 
Court, and the Court declares and maintains the Constitution. To weaken one is to weaken 
the other. To destroy one is to destroy the other. To weaken either is to weaken the 
foundations of our Republic; to destroy either is to destroy the Republic.
180
 
By weakening the legitimacy of the Court, Bailey argued, the President was threatening the 
legitimacy of the government as whole. 
As people voiced their concerns over the “court-packing plan,” the Supreme Court also 
started to rule in accordance with public will, giving life to what McCloskey calls the 
“Constitutional Revolution of 1937.”181 Described as the “switch in time that saved nine,” the 
Court overturned itself in West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, upholding a state minimum 
wage law and ruled in favor of the New Deal law, National Labor Relations Act, in National 
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation.
182
 In addition to practicing 
judicial restraint, the Court also conceded, in part, to Roosevelt’s reorganization plan. On May 
18, 1937, Justice Van Devanter announced his retirement, giving the President the ability to 
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nominate a new justice to the Court. The combination of these various factors led to the ultimate 
failure of Roosevelt’s attempt to challenge the Court.  
 
The Implications of Roosevelt’s Challenge 
 
In light of President Roosevelt’s challenge to the Supreme Court, it is clear that judicial 
supremacy must interact carefully with popular constitutionalism. As a government body bound 
by the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court must maintain its judicial independence, a fact 
made clear by the overwhelming opposition to Roosevelt’s attempt to politicize the Court. At the 
same time, however, the Court must also concede, to some degree, to the will of the people. In 
just one month after Roosevelt’s announcement to pack the Court, the majority altered its 
position. It had become clear to everyone, even the Justices themselves, that something had to 
give. But, that ‘something’ could never be a congressionally mandated change to the ideology of 
the Judiciary. In turn, Roosevelt’s court-packing plan was not only destroyed but remembered as 
an inappropriate political manipulation.  
 Although judicial supremacy was clearly upheld and judicial independence was fervently 
defended, Roosevelt’s challenge prompted an enlightened perception of popular 
constitutionalism by the Court. As willed by the people, 1937 marked the end of the Lochner era 
for the Judiciary. With the failure of the court-packing plan, the Supreme Court would embark 
on its new position as the champion of civil rights.
183
 The new Court that would emerge from the 
Roosevelt confrontation would combat some of the greatest civil injustices in our nation’s 
history including racial discrimination, racial segregation and gender discrimination and protect 
our most important civil liberties including the freedom of speech and the freedom of religion. 
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The Court, protected by the survival of judicial supremacy and enlightened by a new 
understanding of public support, would now work to secure its dominance over constitutional 
meaning by entering a phase of protecting individual liberties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69 
Rethinking the Authority of the Court 
 
Chapter Four 
 
 
In our modern political system, constitutional interpretation is largely understood to be a task 
reserved for the Supreme Court. When the nation encounters a constitutional debate, it is 
commonplace for the parties of the dispute to bring the issue before the Judiciary to determine a 
proper settlement. Upon the announcement of the judicial decision, the American people and the 
members of government are expected to adhere to that judgment, however controversial it may 
be. For example, on June 25, 2013, when a slight majority of the Court determined that sections 
of the Voting Rights Act were unconstitutional, those sections were no longer enforced.
184
 
Despite considerable evidence proving the importance of those sections in preventing voting 
discrimination and the substantial backlash occurring from their invalidation, the policy of the 
Court was implemented.
185
 President Obama even expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
judgment, urging Congress “to pass legislation to ensure every American has equal access to the 
polls.”186 Regardless of his own position on the issue, however, the President did not refuse its 
enforcement. Judicial supremacy necessitated that all Americans consider the Court’s decision in 
Shelby County v. Holder as binding. 
However, this dominating narrative of constitutional interpretation is not infallible. In light of 
the two case studies presented in my work, it is clear that there is space for alternative 
interpretations in modern constitutional dialogue. In the confrontations posed by both Abraham 
Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt, popular constitutionalism successfully asserted itself over the 
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supremacy of the Court. In the first case, when the American people disagreed with Chief Justice 
Taney’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, they turned to the amendment process. Through the 
enactment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, popular will demanded the reversal of 
Dred Scott and Taney’s interpretation of the Constitution. In a similar fashion, the American 
people practiced popular constitutionalism to successfully undermine the Court’s dominance 
over economic policy during Roosevelt’s presidency. To challenge the constitutional 
interpretation of the Court and assert their approval of Roosevelt’s regulation legislation, the 
American people expressed their will by reelecting Roosevelt in the election of 1936. Thus, 
during the presidencies of Lincoln and Roosevelt, the American people successfully demanded 
that popular will act as the authoritative voice over problematic judicial decisions.  
In considering the successes of popular constitutionalism in these two case studies, however, 
it is clear that popular constitutionalism advanced as the legitimacy of Supreme Court was 
weakened. Prior to the passage of the Civil War Amendments and the reelection of 1936, both 
Lincoln and Roosevelt initiated formidable assaults on the supremacy of the Supreme Court. In 
his challenge to Dred Scott, Lincoln questions the finality of the ruling and calls into question the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over “vital” questions. Roosevelt also confronts the legitimacy 
of the Court in his challenge, proposing a reorganizational scheme to make the Judiciary more 
‘effective’ with the addition of younger justices. Although it is not clear that these presidents 
were the catalyst for popular constitutionalism during their presidencies, it is a pattern in their 
challenges that cannot be ignored. 
Although popular constitutional effectively altered the direction of the Court in both cases, 
the departmentalist theories put forth by Lincoln and Roosevelt to promote alternate methods of 
interpretation proved to be problematic. In Lincoln’s challenge to Ex parte Merryman, his 
 71 
defiance of a judicial order was thought to violate the proper power dynamics of government and 
threaten the authority of the Court as a federal branch.
187
  In Roosevelt’s challenge, similarly, the 
President’s proposal to restructure the judicial branch with the addition of justices received 
considerable backlash because it threatened the political independence of the Court. In defending 
their constitutional discrepancies with the Court, both presidents asserted that they, as a 
coordinate branch of government, had equal authority to interpret the Constitution. In reconciling 
their differences with the Court, however, both presidents exceeded the limitations of the 
departmentalist theory. In light of the backlash both presidents received, it is clear that the 
coordinate construction theory does not allow for political actors to threaten the legitimacy or 
independence of the Courts. Thus, although popular constitutionalism succeeded through the 
weakening of judicial supremacy in my two case studies, departmentalism could not. 
Although the American government is not on the brink of a Civil War nor encountering the 
grave economic hardships of the 1930’s, the authority to answer constitutional questions remains 
just as crucial to national policy now as it did then. After the Court’s Constitutional Revolution 
of 1937, the impact of the Court expanded tremendously. With the passage of cases like Brown 
v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade and Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court was credited 
with settling some of the nation’s most controversial social issues.188 With the extension of 
judicial influence, the theory of judicial supremacy was no longer assumed but proclaimed as 
reality. In Cooper v. Aaron, all nine justices agreed, “…the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this 
Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”189 
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Judicial supremacy did not have to be defended, according to Chief Justice Warren, for it was an 
essential characteristic of the American government. 
With the proclamation of judicial supremacy as a legitimate feature of government, the 
theories of departmentalism and popular sovereignty have also evolved. Popular 
constitutionalism has, in light of diminished popular resistance to judicial decisions, become an 
extension of judicial supremacy. According to Larry Kramer, Brown v. Board of Education, the 
landmark case invalidating racial segregation, launched an era of public acceptance for judicial 
supremacy.
190
 Thus, by the time the Warren Court had made its confident claims in Cooper v. 
Aaron, the American people had already accepted the Court as final arbiters of the Constitution.  
Along with the evolution of popular constitutionalism, two areas of constitutionalism have 
also developed in respect to departmentalism. The first development has been the narrowing of 
the Political Questions Doctrine, a former tool of judicial self-restraint. Originated in the opinion 
of Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned, "Questions, in their nature political, or 
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this 
court."
191
 In his opinion, Marshall created a limitation on the Court’s jurisdiction: in all cases 
where the issue should be resolved by another branch of government, the Court would defer the 
question to that respective department. The Political Question Doctrine, in theory, is a direct 
mechanism of departmentalism. However, as Louis Henkin argues, the practice of employing the 
doctrine is in itself a testament to judicial supremacy. In his essay, Henkin writes, “(the Supreme 
Court) is not refusing to pass on the power of the political branches; it passes upon it, only to 
affirm that they had the power which had been challenged and that nothing in the Constitution 
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prohibited the particular exercise of it.”192 Thus, it is not surprising to find that the Judiciary has 
consistently narrowed the definition of a “political question,” resulting in cases like Baker v. 
Carr and Davis v. Bandemer where the Court determines they do in fact have jurisdiction over 
political questions.
193
  
A second implication of heightened judicial supremacy has resulted in the introduction of 
alternative mechanisms of departmentalism. In the cases of Lincoln and Roosevelt, both 
presidents appealed directly to the American people or to Congress to receive approval of their 
departmentalist claims. Today, the use of “signing statements” has become one method 
employed by presidents to put forth their own constitutional interpretations without the need for 
approbation. Made controversial during the presidency of George W. Bush, signing statements 
allow presidents to enact their own interpretation of a bill when signing a piece of congressional 
legislation into law.  
For example, when current president Barack Obama signed the 2013 National Defense 
Authorization Act into law, he included in his “signing statement” that he did not support the 
limitation on “the president’s ability to transfer detainees out of military prisons in Guantanamo 
Bay and Afghanistan.” In light of his disagreement as to the constitutionality of that provision, 
he declared, “In the event that these statutory restrictions operate in a manner that violate 
constitutional separation of powers principles, my administration will implement them in a 
manner that avoids the constitutional conflict.” Thus, by including his disagreement with the 
limitation provision in his signing statement, President Obama made it clear that the executive 
branch would enforce his interpretation of the National Defense Authorization Act. In asserting 
this claim, the President is practicing an independent right to interpret the text, embodying the 
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theory of departmentalism. Although the constitutionality of signing statements has not yet been 
determined, this emerging mechanism of departmentalism has served as a clear evolution of the 
arguments and plans posed by Lincoln and Roosevelt under more turbulent times.   
Although it is impossible to determine the future of constitutional dialogue, it is clear that the 
theories of popular constitutionalism and departmentalism remain applicable theories of 
constitutional interpretation. Although the theory of judicial supremacy acts as the dominant 
narrative in modern discourse, alternative modes of constitutionalism have succeeded in the past 
and may certainly assume dominance in the future. Whether they will exist harmoniously with 
judicial supremacy or require the weakening of the Court’s legitimacy is a question that remains 
to be answered in the constitutional conflicts of our future. In the event that our nation sees 
another crisis like those witnessed by Lincoln and Roosevelt, we may just find out. 
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